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The Aftermathof the SecondWodd War
lie Ln itd Stthe 5cc' nd \\o1d \Var began withthe attack on Pcai 11 larbo:.l)ctciuber :. lh 11.This wasnlvtwent' \ C15t tcr thutil ohe Firt \\cc dWar. thetiortest ititer'. al ht'.cnt:a' tnurinaIit'i'.. l-ult\-sixeaipassed trout theISt: :t thc\\ai ot I"12to the lieimiflOf the Civil and fitt-two,iu t! c (j\ ti ic thelust \\otld\Var. J1e So md\\ur!d \\ar undedwith the surrenderof lapan, .-\uut 14. 1 9-15.It iditheult to assicua date to thebeginning of the .oidwar. Peihap itwas already inprogress at thattune or earlier, thoughunder cover.The first halfof 1917,however.W35 marked bytwo e'. ems thatpointed toa clearrecognition thatwe engaaecl inald war withthe U.S.S.R.The firstwas Presi- dent Irumanscu nest on March12 for aidto Greece andTurke. to cf.)ml)atcommunism. Thesecond wasSecretaryMarsbalFs speech onJ tine S at l-lar\ard'niversitv callingfor api-ograni of assistanceto the freecountries of WesternEurope. Andin '.1arch of the nextsear the So jetland blockadeof Berlinled to theinitia- tion on April 1 ofthe airlift.The KoreanWar, becauseit was con- ducted byorthodoxmeans. can be dateddefinitely. Itwas tateci on June2,5. 1950by theinvasion ofSouth Korea1)V the North Koreanarmies.1The warresulted inheavy fighting:the mantenancC of largeground. air,and seaforces inthe Korean area; and, fInally,
armistice negotiationsofunprecedentedlength. .-\nd in this(-ountrv auituniense stimuluswas givento irtil itarv preparation.
Consider theinipacl oftheseevents on federal
expenditures. The briefestperiod betweenmalot- scars inour historywas fol- 52lowed by the greatest war; two years after it was concluded caine
the cold war; and tliice ycai s latc-, the Koicati \Var.1 lie'steps'
by which federal expwidit ures have increased iollowinwars will
be recalledlong and low at first, and then sliniter and higher.
There was barely time after the Fitst World War [or a [till adj tist-
nient. to conditions of and, certainly, the few years of peace
after the close oh. the Second IVorid \Var were too short [or such
an adjustment. Further, the (:old war (lid not cease with the (:0111-
ing of the Korcati War, but rather was intensifIed. The Korean
\\Tar may, mdcccl, be regarded as only the "hot'' [)ortion of the
global cold war.
At the time of this writing, the peace emerging [ruin the Korean
truceis uneasy. And the partition of Indochina seems to be
leading to a similarly unstable arrangement in that country.
1'hie prospe:t on these and other accounts is for continuing very
large military expenditures. There may be sonic reduction from
the present level, but there can be no real letdown in preparation.
Technological advances, for reasons that have been given, will
continue, and probably at an accelerating rate. The new weapons
developed will be exploited. The swift pace of a mechanized
attack, time kind to be expected in the event of active war, permits
no other course. Such an assault would have tobe stop1)cd by the
weapons on hand, and these wouldhave to be available in. sufficient
quantities. Thus a recurrence of the declining costs, ascompared
with the pre-existing level, that followed earlier warsin our history
is not to be expected so long as the present ''East-West"problems
remain unsolved.
The emphasis of aid to friendly foreigncountries is chiang-
ing. More is being granted for military purposesand less for
economic. Military assistance is ourcontribution to a common
defense establishment, and the amount isrelated both to the size
of that establishment and to thecontribution of the cooperating
foreign countries. Assuming a continuanceof existing world ten-
sions, the volume of such aid willprOl)al)ly not decline. Economic
assistance is also given, but recoveryfrom war-induced dislocations
has now proceeded to the pointwhere grants for this purpose are
less necessary. Conceivablythis amount could decline further.I
After pastwars, surpluses have appearedin the federal1(VCUUCS, the debt hasbeen reduced, andintercst payments havedeclined. hut in viewof the outlookfor military cxpcudituressubtintia) reductions of thepnncipa! of the debtnow arc m11)1obal)le. The numberof veterans, unlikeafter other majorwars, is steadily beingaugmented by thedischarge of servicemenfrom the greatly enlargedmilitary establishmentresulting from thecold and the Koreanwars. And the Koreanveterans who so desirehave been goingto school at federalexpense. Although totalexpendi- tures forveterans may notsoon i-each the peakfollowing the Sec- ond WorldWar, itseems probable thatveterans expenditureswill be higher inrelation to thenumber o servicementhan ever before. The tendencyof civil expendituresto increase bothabsolutely and asa percentage of thetotal aftermajor wars has beennoted. But, in thepast, militaryexpenditures declinedin such periods. and the ratioof total federalexpenditures to thenational income was much smallerthan it has beenin theyears since the Second World \Var.The questiontherefore ariseswhether, underthe new conditions,past experience willbe repeated.The increasein civil expendituresgenerally, unlikethe increase inmilitary out- lays, is nottinder thecompulsion ofnecessity.1 Nordoes suchan increase havethe inevitabilityof the largerinterestpayments that follow an increasein the nationaldebt or of thegreater outlay for dischargedveterans as theirnumbersmount. There ischoice, and accordingly thepressure for additionalcivil functionsis less. More- over, resistanceto larger expendituresincreases:taxes already high will becomehigher, or ifthe financing isby borrowing,the con- sequences of addingto an alreadygreat debt vihl givepause. These factorsare likely to modemate or to checkprevioustendencies to- ward a relativelygreater growth incivil than inmilitai-y outlays. I Onlyexpenditures foratomic energy havethat stimulus.But this is hecauseof the
military significanceof the productionof atomicenergy. For anexplanation of wh
the devclopmcntof atomicenergy was includedin civilexpenditures, seeAppendix
R. page 68.
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